The Oil Chokepoint Is Moving
By A. Sadeghian, Ph.D.
For months, discussion of the widening Middle East war and its consequences for the global energy system has centered on one narrow body of water: the Strait of Hormuz. The emphasis was justified. Roughly one-fifth of the world's petroleum supply normally passes through this corridor between Iran and Oman, making it perhaps the most consequential energy chokepoint in the world. Iran does not have to sink every tanker or physically seal the strait to exploit this geographical advantage. It only has to make passage sufficiently dangerous that shipowners, insurers, crews, and energy companies begin treating the Persian Gulf as an unacceptable commercial risk.
During the last forty-eight hours, however, the geography of the energy crisis has changed. A series of developments involving Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen has created pressure on the opposite side of the Arabian Peninsula. Drones launched from Iraqi territory struck Saudi Arabia's East-West oil pipeline, the principal land route designed to allow Saudi crude to bypass Hormuz. Saudi authorities subsequently shut the pipeline temporarily as a precaution while engineers assessed its condition. At approximately the same time, Yemen's Iran-aligned Houthis advanced along the Red Sea coast and reached Perim Island, also known as Mayun, which occupies an extraordinarily important position in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
These developments should not be exaggerated into a claim that Iran and the Houthis literally control both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. They do not need to. The more consequential development is that the primary Persian Gulf shipping route, Saudi Arabia's principal pipeline alternative, and the Red Sea exit used by that alternative are now simultaneously exposed to military and commercial pressure. What had been viewed largely as a crisis surrounding Hormuz is becoming a struggle over an interconnected energy transportation system extending across the Arabian Peninsula from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.
Saudi Arabia's Escape Route From Hormuz
Saudi Arabia understood the vulnerability created by Hormuz long before the present war. Its answer was the East-West pipeline, generally known as Petroline, which runs approximately 1,200 kilometers from the kingdom's oil-producing Eastern Province across the country to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. With capacity of roughly seven million barrels per day, the pipeline represents much more than a piece of petroleum infrastructure. It is a strategic bypass designed to ensure that Saudi Arabia can continue exporting enormous quantities of oil even if navigation through Hormuz becomes difficult or impossible.
The present conflict demonstrated precisely why that investment mattered. As the security environment around Hormuz deteriorated, Saudi Arabia dramatically increased its reliance on the western route. Oil that ordinarily would have moved from Gulf terminals through Hormuz could instead travel across the kingdom by pipeline, reach Yanbu, and enter international markets through the Red Sea. In effect, Saudi Arabia possessed an enormous geographical insurance policy against Iran's ability to disrupt the Persian Gulf.
That insurance policy itself has now come under attack. Saudi authorities reported that several drones launched from Iraqi territory struck sections of the East-West pipeline in the Riyadh and Medina regions. The attacks caused injuries and infrastructure damage, and the Saudi Energy Ministry subsequently announced a precautionary shutdown while technical teams examined the pipeline and assessed its safety. The Saudi government has described this as a temporary shutdown rather than abandonment of the system, an important distinction because the kingdom has substantial experience repairing energy infrastructure damaged in previous attacks.
The Iraqi origin of the drones nevertheless changes the strategic calculation. Baghdad acknowledged that the attack originated from Iraqi territory and opened an investigation. The Iraqi government also dismissed a military commander in Maysan Province, a region bordering Iran in which Iran-aligned Shiite militias have historically maintained influence. Public evidence has not yet established conclusively which organization conducted the operation. Reuters has emphasized the presence of Iran-backed armed groups in the region, while assessments by the Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project have identified either Houthi elements or Iran-aligned Iraqi militias as plausible perpetrators.
Saudi Arabia has so far responded cautiously. Riyadh has indicated that it will give the Iraqi government an opportunity to prevent additional attacks while reserving the right to defend Saudi territory and infrastructure. That restraint should not obscure the strategic significance of what occurred. A pipeline constructed to reduce Saudi vulnerability to an Iranian threat at Hormuz has demonstrated that it possesses vulnerabilities of its own. A 1,200-kilometer pipeline crossing open territory cannot be defended in the same manner as a refinery, terminal, or military installation. Even sophisticated air-defense systems face enormous difficulties protecting infrastructure extending across such distances against relatively inexpensive drones.
Bab el-Mandeb Becomes the Second Pressure Point
The developments in Yemen may eventually prove even more consequential. Houthi forces have advanced rapidly along Yemen's Red Sea coastline and have taken territory from forces associated with the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Reuters reported on September 11 that Houthi forces had reached Perim Island at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. The significance of that location becomes obvious when one examines a map.
Perim sits within Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow maritime passage connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea. Ships traveling between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal normally pass through this corridor. The principal alternative is the vastly longer journey around the Cape of Good Hope at the southern end of Africa, adding distance, fuel consumption, crew time, insurance costs, and pressure on the global tanker fleet.
Possession of territory around Bab el-Mandeb is not equivalent to complete naval control of the strait, but that distinction provides considerably less reassurance to commercial shipping than it might appear. Modern economic warfare does not require a navy to stop and inspect every vessel. Missiles, drones, mines, explosive boats, and even the credible possibility of attack can alter the behavior of private companies. Shipowners can reroute vessels, insurers can increase premiums or withdraw coverage, crews can refuse dangerous voyages, and energy companies can conclude that the commercial risks exceed the benefits of continuing normal operations.
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