Yemen: The Houthis' New Front
As Iran squeezes Hormuz, the Houthis are transforming Bab el-Mandeb into a second pressure point-- putting Saudi Arabia, Red Sea shipping and the global oil trade in an increasingly dangerous position.
By A. Sadeghian, Ph.D.
For decades, the strategic nightmare of the Persian Gulf had a name: the Strait of Hormuz. Almost every serious discussion of Middle Eastern energy security began with the possibility that war with Iran could disrupt the narrow passage through which an enormous share of the world's petroleum normally travels. Saudi Arabia consequently spent billions of dollars developing an alternative: move oil across the kingdom through its East-West pipeline to Yanbu on the Red Sea and escape the vulnerability of Hormuz. The war of 2026 has exposed the weakness in that solution. Saudi Arabia may have found a route around Hormuz, but at the other end of the Arabian Peninsula lies another narrow passage: Bab el-Mandeb. And beside it stands one of the most heavily armed nonstate movements in the Middle East.
The Houthis Move South
Yemen's Houthi movement has dramatically changed the military geography of the southern Red Sea. In its September offensive, the movement captured the historic port of Mokha and advanced along Yemen's western coast. Houthi forces subsequently reached Mayun, also known as Perim, the island sitting inside the Bab el-Mandeb Strait itself, and then seized Greater and Lesser Hanish islands farther north in the Red Sea. Saudi-backed Yemeni forces have attempted to recover lost territory, and Saudi and Yemeni aircraft have intensified attacks on Houthi positions. Yet the Houthis have achieved their biggest territorial gains in years along one of the world's most strategically important coastlines.
The offensive has been accompanied by renewed attacks against Saudi Arabia. The Houthis launched missiles and drones against targets including the military airbase at Khamis Mushait. Saudi authorities reported that thirteen civilians were wounded. Emergency alerts have also reached Saudi cities including Yanbu, the kingdom's vital Red Sea oil port. The important point is not that the Houthis can defeat Saudi Arabia conventionally; they cannot. It is that a movement Saudi Arabia went to war to suppress more than eleven years ago can still threaten Saudi territory and energy infrastructure while simultaneously conducting a major territorial offensive in Yemen.
The timing could hardly be worse for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia's roughly 1,200-kilometer East-West pipeline, constructed in the 1980s to allow petroleum to bypass Hormuz, is largely out of operation following a drone attack launched from Iraqi territory. The line had recently been carrying millions of barrels per day toward the Red Sea. Repairs are expected to take weeks. Saudi Arabia therefore confronts pressure at Hormuz, disruption of the pipeline designed to bypass Hormuz, and a resurgent Houthi military presence around the Red Sea route on which the kingdom increasingly depends.
The Gate of Tears
Bab el-Mandeb is not merely another waterway on a map. Its Arabic name is commonly translated as the "Gate of Tears." The strait separates Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula from Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa. To the north lies the Red Sea and ultimately the Suez Canal; to the south lie the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Ships traveling between Asia and Europe through Suez normally must pass Bab el-Mandeb. Avoiding it generally means sailing around the Cape of Good Hope, adding thousands of miles, additional fuel consumption, higher freight charges, longer delivery times and increased insurance expenses.
The strategic importance of the strait has increased because of the war around Hormuz. Saudi Arabia increasingly used its Red Sea outlets as an alternative to the Persian Gulf. By early June, Saudi oil exports from the Red Sea end of the East-West pipeline had risen above five million barrels per day, according to International Energy Agency figures reported by the Associated Press. Now the pipeline itself has been severely disrupted while Houthi forces have moved onto strategically important territory around the southern entrance to the Red Sea.
Control of coastline and islands does not mean that the Houthis can simply press a button and close Bab el-Mandeb. The United States and its allies retain overwhelming conventional naval and air power, and the African side of the strait remains outside Houthi control. But modern commercial shipping does not require a formal naval blockade before it changes behavior. Missile attacks, drones, explosive boats, mines or even the credible possibility of attack can raise insurance premiums and convince shipowners to reroute vessels.
The Houthis demonstrated this after late 2023. Their attacks on vessels in and around the Red Sea led major shipping companies to divert traffic around Africa. Shipping through Bab el-Mandeb subsequently fell dramatically. The consequences extended far beyond the ships actually attacked. A relatively small armed movement demonstrated that it could impose economic costs on companies and countries thousands of miles away simply by making a narrow maritime corridor sufficiently dangerous.
Who Are the Houthis?
To understand how the Houthis acquired this power, it is necessary to understand what they are. The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, are not an army invented by Iran and transplanted into Yemen. Their origins are indigenous. They emerged from the Zaydi Shiite community of northern Yemen, particularly around Saada. Zaydism has existed in Yemen for centuries and is doctrinally different from the Twelver Shiism that dominates the Islamic Republic of Iran.
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