'OceanGates toxic safety culture, corporate structure, and operational practices were critically flawed and at the core of these failures were glaring disparities between their written safety protocols and their actual practices.'
'During early OceanGate' 'operations, Mr. Rush's intentional and systemic efforts to misrepresent' 'compliance with standards and partnerships relating to safety, engineering, and regulatory oversight provided a false sense of safety for their passengers (mission specialists and contractors) [by] intentional skirting of regulations, often achieved by masking the true intentions and operations of the vessels.'
'OceanGate's management' 'fostered an organizational culture that increased operational risk and allowed financial pressures, operational demands' 'to override their Mission Directors duties and authorities.'
'The mounting financial pressures on the company in 2023 resulted in an increased risk to Titan's hull and its operations.'
'Subsequent to the implosion, the individuals aboard Titan were subjected to approximately 4,930 psi, resulting in the instantaneous death of all five occupants.'
Accordingly, I am not defending or supporting testing, quality control, or operations by OceanGate, but I am challenging the basic premise of this Netflix movie (click here). The movie concluded with a final statement that "No criminal charges have been filed in connection with the Titan's implosion and the loss of five lives." To be perfectly clear, an implosion did not destroy the Titan hull - an explosion destroyed the hull. The movie incorrectly - but in accord with MBI conclusions - slants all presented information toward a Titan hull implosion. Although I agree that all five occupants were killed by an implosion wave, the Titan was shattered by an explosion wave.
Many Joined In to Follow a Path of Misconception
Consistent with MBI conclusions, the chief investigator for the Coast Guard clearly stated in the Netflix movie that 'additional fibers were breaking after dive 80' [in the hull, and] 'It is really, in my mind, the smoking gun that eventually caused this [disaster]'.
By neglecting scientific conclusions, the "Titan" movie focused on a hull implosion rather than the true hull explosion cause. Now, a flood of news outlets boldly claim that an implosion was a certainty, as exemplified by some of many publications. I strongly disagree.
- "Titan viewers left unsettled by OceanGate CEO's chilling comment in Netflix documentary" claimed that [Titan] 'tells the story of the events that led to the deadly implosion' (click here).
- "The 5 biggest takeaways from Titan: The OceanGate Disaster: Narcissism, hubris, and a 'cult-like' operation", 'Netflix's new documentary about the infamous Titan submersible implosion is now streaming' (click here).
- "The Biggest Revelations From Netflix's Titan: The OceanGate Disaster", stated that 'it wasn't that we didn't follow a set of regulations that led to the implosion, but that it was the company culture.' (click here).
- "OceanGate Disaster Netflix Trailer Sparks Criticism", stated that 'a submersible operated by OceanGate Expeditions imploded while on an expedition' (click here).
Netflix and Titan Safety Questions
Given that the premise of the movie is incorrect, several comments in the movie are called into question - just asking. I have other objections to the Netflix movie, but the most important questions are listed as follows.
- The official trailer for the movie broke out with the comment that 'There was no way of knowing when Titan was going to fail, but it was a mathematical certainty that it would fail' (.youtube.com/watch?v=CplcmrxZMyo). Question: How can there be a mathematical certainty of failure if the failure cause is uncertain?
- I cited only the viewport as a probable initial failure cause, and the MBI disagrees, while stating that either adhesive at the titanium dome failed or a section of the forward hull failed. In my opinion, the adhesive or the viewport were likely causes (click here). I have sent copies of Op Eds voicing my safety concerns for an implosion and a hull explosion to the Coast Guard since June 27, 2023, which was 9 days after the Titan disaster. Question: Why did final reports by the National Transportation Safety Board exclude any mention for considerations of a hull explosion?
- Prior to building a new hull, there were 'attention-getting pops' and a crack in the hull was also repaired. Question: Were these pops dangerous to Titan operations?
- I agree that the banging sound heard on the 80th dive sparked concern. 'We were still under water and there was a large bang or cracking sound', followed by probable popping sounds and probable fiber breaks (Figure 3). As more fibers break over time, the hull weakens. The final Titan report opposed the use of carbon fiber in submersibles. W Question: Would a thicker hull have been successful?
- A fired OceanGate submersible pilot and Director of Marine Operations stated that 'At the time I had no experience for carbon fiber.' 'You could actually see the porosity. You could see the delaminations.' Delaminations occur when plies separate inside the five construction layers of the hull, where plies consist of carbon-fiber strands and epoxy bonded together. In the first day of the investigation hearings, Figure 4 was presented as evidence. Scrap pieces of different subs contained delaminations. How to address delaminations 'is still being worked out' (click here). Question: Were these initial delaminations dangerous to the Titan?

Figure 3. Titan acoustic sensors recorded the bang on dive 80 and subsequent probable pops on the subsequent dive 81.
(Image by Adapted from US Coast Guard by Leishear Engineering, LLC) Details DMCA

Figure 4. Delaminations and porosity of a Titan precursor (Cyclops) submersible hull and a light shown through that hull section to see porosity. Delaminations for a scrap section of a Titan hull are also shown.
(Image by U.S. Coast Guard) Details DMCA

Figure 5. Post incident viewport structural analysis, where a pre-incident analysis was also completed. The MBI believes that the design to the right was installed on the second Titan that failed.
(Image by Kemper Engineering Services, LLC) Details DMCA
The Titan Viewport Warrants an Augmented Marine Board of Investigation
The viewport was not adequately tested to withstand the high pressures near the ocean floor for repeated dives, where the residual strength of the viewport to prevent a viewport implosion decreased as the number of dives increased. The hull and adhesive bonds were not tested for cyclic failure. A single underwater pressure test was performed since there was no other specific data available.
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