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Putin's Strategic Failure: Why Time Is No Longer on Russia's Side

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.
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Putin's Strategic Failure: Why Time Is No Longer on Russia's Side

By Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.
Clinical Neuropsychologist

When Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Kremlin appeared convinced that Kyiv would fall within days. Russian planners expected a rapid collapse of the Ukrainian government, limited Western resistance, and a geopolitical victory that would permanently restore Moscow's dominance over its former Soviet sphere.

More than four years later, none of those objectives has been achieved.

Wars are ultimately judged not by headlines or daily battlefield maps but by whether they accomplish their political aims. By that standard, Russia has little reason for celebration. War has become one of the most expensive strategic miscalculations of the twenty-first century.

Russia still occupies significant Ukrainian territory and continues offensive operations. It retains vast military resources, one of the world's largest nuclear arsenals, and considerable industrial capacity. Yet military power alone does not determine strategic success. The central question remains whether Russia is closer today to achieving its original objectives than it was in 2022. The answer is increasingly difficult to defend.

The first and perhaps greatest failure was political. Ukraine did not collapse. Its government survived, its armed forces adapted, and its national identity became stronger rather than weaker. Instead of demonstrating Russian dominance, the invasion accelerated the emergence of a distinctly independent Ukrainian political identity that is unlikely to disappear for generations.

Equally important, Putin underestimated the ability of democratic societies to sustain long-term support for Ukraine. Western governments have debated costs, strategies, and military aid, but they did not abandon Kyiv. Instead, the invasion revitalized European security cooperation and encouraged many governments to increase defense spending dramatically. One of Moscow's principal objectives-- to divide Europe-- often produced the opposite effect.

Perhaps the greatest military surprise has been the revolution in drone warfare.

Military academies traditionally emphasized tanks, aircraft, artillery, and naval power. Ukraine demonstrated that inexpensive unmanned systems could fundamentally alter this equation. Drones costing only thousands of dollars now destroy equipment worth millions. Command posts, ammunition depots, fuel storage facilities, bridges, logistics centers, and even strategic aircraft have become increasingly vulnerable.

History occasionally witnesses technological innovations that redefine warfare. Machine guns transformed World War I. Aircraft carriers reshaped World War II. Precision-guided weapons altered conflicts after 1991. Today, inexpensive drones are producing another military revolution.

Russia has attempted to adapt by expanding electronic warfare, strengthening air defenses, and increasing domestic drone production. Yet adaptation has not eliminated the underlying problem: modern logistics have become far more vulnerable than military planners previously imagined.

Nowhere is this transformation more evident than in Crimea.

For years, Crimea represented one of Putin's greatest political achievements. Annexed in 2014, it became both a symbol of Russian resurgence and a critical military hub supporting operations throughout southern Ukraine. Today, however, the peninsula increasingly resembles a logistical liability rather than an untouchable fortress.

Repeated Ukrainian strikes against bridges, fuel depots, electrical infrastructure, ports, railway connections, and supply routes have forced Russian authorities to divert considerable resources simply to maintain normal operations. Reports of fuel restrictions, electrical disruptions, and emergency measures illustrate how sustained long-range attacks can gradually weaken an opponent without requiring massive conventional offensives.

This shift highlights an important military principle. Victory is no longer measured solely by capturing territory. Increasingly, it depends upon degrading an opponent's ability to sustain military operations over time.

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D. Social Media Pages: Facebook page url on login Profile not filled in       Twitter page url on login Profile not filled in       Linkedin page url on login Profile not filled in       Instagram page url on login Profile not filled in

I was born and raised in Tehran, Iran, and came to the United States in 1976 to study psychology. Over time, America became my home, and I later became a U.S. citizen. My professional career has centered on clinical neuropsychology, particularly (more...)
 
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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.

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The Drone Revolution Has Reached Moscow

The publication of this article coincides with yet another development that reinforces its central argument. Reports indicate that Ukraine has launched another large-scale drone operation deep inside Russian territory, striking a major satellite communications facility in the Moscow region while simultaneously conducting coordinated attacks across numerous Russian regions. Whether every operational objective was achieved is ultimately less important than the strategic implications of these repeated penetrations.

Military historians often identify certain conflicts as turning points in the evolution of warfare. The American Civil War demonstrated the devastating power of industrialized weapons. World War I rendered nineteenth-century battlefield tactics obsolete. World War II established air power and aircraft carriers as decisive strategic instruments. The 1991 Gulf War introduced the era of precision-guided munitions. The war in Ukraine may eventually be remembered as the conflict that demonstrated how inexpensive unmanned systems can fundamentally alter the balance between offense and defense.

Classical military doctrine has always emphasized strategic depth. Nations sought to protect their capitals, industries, command centers, and logistical networks by placing them far from the battlefield. Geography itself functioned as a defensive asset. Today's battlefield increasingly challenges that assumption. A relatively inexpensive drone, guided by satellite navigation and real-time intelligence, can threaten facilities hundreds of miles beyond the front line. The distinction between the "front" and the "rear" is steadily disappearing.

The repeated targeting of Russian communications facilities illustrates this transformation. Modern wars are not won solely by destroying armored formations or occupying territory. They are also fought through the gradual degradation of an opponent's command, communications, intelligence, transportation, fuel distribution, and industrial infrastructure. A military that cannot communicate efficiently, protect its logistical networks, or maintain secure rear areas eventually faces increasing operational constraints regardless of its numerical strength.

Equally significant is the psychological dimension. Authoritarian governments often derive political legitimacy from projecting competence, control, and security. Repeated successful strikes against infrastructure deep inside Russian territory challenge that image, forcing the Kremlin to devote growing resources to homeland defense while simultaneously attempting to reassure its own population. Strategic pressure is therefore being exerted not only on military capabilities but also on political perceptions.

This observation should not be interpreted as a prediction of imminent Russian defeat. Russia remains one of the world's largest military powers, possessing substantial industrial capacity, significant manpower, and formidable strategic capabilities. However, the nature of military competition is changing. The relevant question is no longer simply who possesses more tanks or aircraft, but who adapts more rapidly to an evolving technological environment.

In many respects, Ukraine has transformed necessity into innovation. Unable to match Russia in conventional military resources, it has increasingly relied upon technological asymmetry-- leveraging drones, intelligence, and precision strikes to impose disproportionate costs on a much larger adversary. History repeatedly demonstrates that military innovation often originates not with the strongest power, but with the side most compelled to adapt.

For military strategists, defense analysts, and political leaders worldwide, Ukraine has become more than a regional conflict. It has become a laboratory for twenty-first-century warfare. The lessons being learned in this conflict will almost certainly influence military doctrine, defense procurement, and strategic planning for decades to come.

If that assessment proves correct, historians may ultimately conclude that the most enduring legacy of this war was not merely the redrawing of territorial boundaries, but the fundamental redefinition of how modern wars are fought.

Submitted on Tuesday, Jun 30, 2026 at 11:17:10 PM

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This is a brilliant analysis.

Far less brilliant was/is the West's, and particularly America's, failure to anticipate the rise of drones as a war-changing technology, perhaps the greatest since the development of air power itself. And it's not like there was no warning. Even I was telling anyone who would listen back in the early 2010s when drones were only used clumsily for reconnaissance, that war would never be fought the same way again. America actually had a slight lead in drone technology back then, but squandered because:

A. The leaders of both parties were ossified and in love or in thrall to Big Iron warfighting instruments - from massive and already impractical 60 ton tanks to aircraft carriers that needed their own fleets of billion dollar battleships just to protect them, not to necessarily attack the enemy on their own. Strangely, even today drones are rarely launched from nations that can afford aircraft carriers, despite the advantage of having a navy that can close the gap short range drones are limited to, especially when it's America doing the attacks. America has the world's best navy by far yet it relies on "top gun" manned aircraft even now.

B. The failure of American weapons makers to pivot to cheaper and simpler drones. Our industrial war capacity was deliberately reduced to a few mega-manufacturers in the 1990s when the Soviet Union fell. The planners in Washington were having their budgets cut and the thinking was that it would be easier and cheaper to just have a few merged major weapons makers instead of a lot of smaller players. From the manufacturer's POV it made sense to distribute manufacturing inefficiently to as many states as possible, to ensure congressional support from individual representatives. This kind of self-promoting loop worked to ensure a steady supply of funding and Big Iron development. It did not meet the moment when the threat became rogue actors from the Middle East, let alone a revaunchist Russia over-reliant on an America too far away and too preoccupied with its own problems to rapidly defend EU territory, even while carelessly pushing NATO borders ever closer to Russia, despite warnings from that country that it would not stand for it much longer. Russia didn't, and an argument could even be made that protecting Sevastopol in Crimea from a raging revolutionary mob in Ukraine was the right thing to do, 2 weeks after the Sochi Olympics.

But that was then. Now, another change may be about to surprise both the EU and America, though not Ukraine, perhaps. The Russians fleeing Crimea with near empty gas tanks are driving fancy cars and are not the average Russians. They are richer, better connected, unused to war and until very recently mostly insulated from it. They are seeing and will talk about the devastation that has fallen well behind the increasingly tenuous front lines where Russia has sent men to die in the meat grinder. That, plus those men themselves becoming increasingly resistant to dying for nothing, or even threatening mutiny as a decorated soldier dared to do on video last week (something that would be a sure death sentence any other time) may mean that Ukraine may only have to apply enough pressure until Russia collapses from pressure from within itself.

Under authoritarian regimes, rigid control of the state works...until it doesn't. And when it doesn't, the end can be startling and swift. That's what happened to the old Soviet Union, which our own CIA failed to predict. It may happen again. At the very least, Putin has had to divert important resources he is running critically short of, just to defend Moscow and the Kremlin within it. Not only is that proving inadequate, it's also obvious that every other region and even its second largest city, St. Petersburg, has been deprived of air defenses just to reroute them, and the dwindling supply of fuel for them, to the capitol. This is becoming obvious to even Russian commentators normally supportive of Putin. Putin's support is waning to levels not seen since the start of the war in 2022, maybe even worse in this rapidly changing environment. It's hard to get accurate information on the censored Russian population's support for Putin now. A destabilized Russia, even if not about to undergo a coup, is obviously a boon to Ukraine, where president Zalinskyy remains popular, despite having to suspend democratic elections due to the war. Things may be changing yet again in ways that almost no one is prepared for.

Submitted on Wednesday, Jul 1, 2026 at 2:26:42 AM

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