The fall of the Assad regime revealed what everyone already suspected: the Assad family itself ran the Captagon trade in Syria. But if we assume the Assad family was indeed at the heart of the trade, how can we explain the continued seizure of millions of Captagon pills within Syria and along its borders with neighboring countries, despite more than five months having passed since the regime's collapse?
This article explores the primary factors that enabled the Captagon trade to not only persist but adapt and evolve after the downfall of the Assad regime.
An International Machine Worth Billions
Despite the prominent role the Assad family played in the Captagon trade, the fall of their regime and the flight of top officials abroad merely severed one link in a vast international network. It did not dismantle the system itself. The Assad family's share in the Captagon economy was estimated at $2.4 billion. In contrast, t he global Captagon trade is valued at around $10 billion, meaning the family controlled, at most, 30% of the market.
The remainder is spread across various regional actors, including networks in Lebanon (notably Hezbollah), Jordan, and the Gulf. In Jordan, an estimated 20% of the Captagon pills smuggled from Syria are sold domestically, while the rest are funneled into the lucrative Gulf markets, particularly Saudi Arabia, the world's largest Captagon consumer. Here, complex trafficking operations ensure the pills are smuggled, stored, and sold at exponentially higher prices. A pill worth under $1 in Syria can fetch up to $20 in Saudi Arabia.
Such profit margins are too attractive for regional syndicates to abandon. The collapse of the Assad regime, rather than disrupting the trade, merely encouraged it to diversify and decentralize. In fact, production and smuggling activities resumed in Syria almost immediately. On May 18, the Jordanian Air Force launched a strike on a suspected trafficker in Syria's southern As-Suwayda province. Just two days earlier, Syrian forces reported the seizure of nine million pills in Aleppo. The system remains very much alive.
Why the Captagon Network Didn't Die with Assad
Despite significant setbacks, including the defeat of the armed opposition in many areas and the destruction of several production facilities, Syria remains the global hub of Captagon production, responsible for an estimated 80% of total global output. This persistence is due in large part to the scale and structure of the domestic network.
According to researcher Hassan Jaber in his 2024 book "The Northern War", more than 12,000 armed individuals are involved in smuggling Captagon in southern Syria alone, spread across roughly 150 factions. Thousands more handle production, packaging, transport, and distribution. The network operates like a shadow state, with well-developed communication lines and logistics.
Inside Syria's Smuggling Empire
What sets this network apart is not just its size but its professionalism. Traffickers employ ingenious smuggling tactics, hiding pills inside furniture, transformers, and even fruit pits. They've used drones, plastic mortars, and even homing pigeons to outsmart border authorities. Their confrontations with Jordanian forces are often intense and prolonged.
Furthermore, a portion of the network once under regime protection, including factions linked to the Fourth Division led by Maher al-Assad, has now splintered. Opposition-controlled areas also host production hubs. With the Assad family out, new players are eager to fill the vacuum, further complicating any effort to dismantle the network.
Criminal Innovation: Smuggling Tactics that Defy Logic
These networks aren't just persistent; they're inventive. From embedding pills in electrical appliances to using pigeons as carriers, their methods adapt faster than border controls can catch up. Such operations reflect an evolution in criminal enterprise that goes beyond mere desperation; it's industrial-scale ingenuity.
From Cartels to Warlords: Who Fills the Vacuum?
Beyond the organized networks, there are smaller producers who once operated in secrecy under regime eyes, often persecuted by state forces to eliminate competition. With the fall of the Assad family, these players are seizing the opportunity to expand. The competition is no longer limited to traditional actors but includes former regime loyalists, local warlords, and ambitious criminal entrepreneurs.
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