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Iran's Great Contradiction: A Nation Desperate for the Future, Ruled by the Past

By ABBAS SADEGHIAN PH, D,.  Posted by Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D. (about the submitter)       (Page 1 of 6 pages)   1 comment

Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.
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IRAN'S GREAT CONTRADICTION
IRAN'S GREAT CONTRADICTION
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Iran's Great Contradiction: A Nation Desperate for the Future, Ruled by the Past

Abbas Sadeghian Ph.D.

Iran's political crisis is usually described through familiar divisions: the Islamic Republic against its opponents, clerics against secularists, conservatives against reformists, monarchists against republicans, or the government against a population demanding greater freedom. Each description contains part of the truth, but none fully captures the deeper contradiction that has followed Iran through more than a century of political upheaval. At the center of the Iranian struggle is a contest between restoration and transformation-- between those who continue to search the past for political legitimacy and those who believe Iran can no longer solve modern problems by resurrecting some supposedly golden period of its history.

This division does not run neatly between the Islamic Republic and its enemies. It runs through the Islamic Republic itself, through the opposition, through conservative and reformist politics, and increasingly between generations. Some seek the revolutionary purity of 1979 and the ideological principles established by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Some opponents of the Islamic Republic imagine restoration of the Pahlavi monarchy. Others reach further backward toward Cyrus, Darius and the grandeur of pre-Islamic Persia. These historical traditions are profoundly different, but they share a temptation: the belief that Iran's political salvation can be discovered somewhere behind it. Meanwhile, a large part of Iranian society appears to be asking a radically different question: Why must our future belong to anybody's past?

The urgency of that question has increased because Iran is no longer having this argument under normal circumstances. The country is suffering through war, sanctions, collapsing purchasing power, severe inflation, energy shortages and deep uncertainty about its economic future. The IMF currently projects Iran's economy to contract by 5.4 percent in 2026 while average consumer-price inflation reaches 68.9 percent. Recent reporting from inside Iran describes families cutting consumption because even ordinary necessities have become increasingly difficult to afford.

Iran therefore faces two crises simultaneously. One is an economic crisis that increasingly affects everyday survival. The other is a political crisis concerning who has the authority to determine the country's direction. The two are now becoming inseparable.

The Unfinished Revolution of 1906

Iran has been wrestling with the problem of accountable government since the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911. The constitutionalists were not merely trying to replace one politician with another. They challenged something much more fundamental: the idea that political authority could exist without meaningful legal limitation. They demanded a constitution, a Majles, laws and constraints upon arbitrary government. For all the contradictions and eventual disappointments of the movement, it introduced into modern Iranian politics an idea that has never disappeared-- the government should ultimately be accountable to the governed.

That struggle was never completed. Iran repeatedly modernized its state without fully democratizing political power. Reza Shah built a stronger centralized government, expanded secular education, created modern institutions, weakened tribal autonomy and accelerated the transformation of Iranian society. Under Mohammad Reza Shah, modernization went considerably further. Universities expanded, industrialization accelerated, cities grew, women entered higher education and professional life in increasing numbers, and a substantial urban middle class emerged. Yet political modernization lagged behind social and economic modernization. Iran became a considerably more modern society without developing equally strong institutions through which that society could determine who governed it.

This became one of the recurring patterns of modern Iranian history: Iranian society repeatedly changed faster than the political system controlling it. That contradiction existed under the monarchy, contributed to the explosion of 1979, and exists in an even more extraordinary form under the Islamic Republic today.

Mossadegh and the Road Iran Lost

Mohammad Mossadegh represented another possible direction. His historical importance cannot be reduced to nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Mossadegh represented an attempt to combine Iranian nationalism, national sovereignty and constitutional government. He believed Iran could resist foreign domination without creating unlimited domestic authority. In that sense, the political project associated with Mossadegh was neither a return to the traditional monarchy nor a religious revolution. It was an attempt to make constitutional nationalism work.

The 1953 overthrow of Mossadegh severely damaged that possibility. The coup, supported by American and British intelligence, strengthened Mohammad Reza Shah and helped move the monarchy toward increasingly centralized and autocratic rule. The consequences extended far beyond the fate of one prime minister. Parliamentary politics became weaker, distrust of Britain and the United States deepened, political opposition became increasingly radicalized, and many Iranians concluded that gradual constitutional politics could not protect national sovereignty. The Shah became stronger after Mossadegh, but the political foundations beneath the monarchy ultimately became more brittle.

This history matters because Iran has repeatedly paid an enormous price when political systems have eliminated the mechanisms through which dissatisfaction can be expressed peacefully. When reform becomes impossible, revolution begins to appear reasonable. When opposition is treated as treason, the opposition eventually begins treating the entire political system as illegitimate.

1979: A Revolution Facing Forward While Looking Backward

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D. Social Media Pages: Facebook Page       Twitter page url on login Profile not filled in       Linkedin page url on login Profile not filled in       Instagram Page

I was born and raised in Tehran, Iran, and came to the United States in 1976 to study psychology. Over time, America became my home, and I later became a U.S. citizen. My professional career has centered on clinical neuropsychology, particularly (more...)
 
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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.

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For decades, Iranian politics has been presented as an endless struggle between reformists and conservatives, but the tragedy is that neither side has ever been strong enough to defeat the other politically or fundamentally change the structure of power. Reformists periodically win elections and promise greater social freedom, economic rationality, engagement with the outside world and a less ideological government. Conservatives and hardliners respond through institutions they control or influence, limiting how far those reforms can go. Then the reformists disappoint their supporters, conservatives regain political ground, public frustration grows, and the cycle begins again.

We saw versions of this under Mohammad Khatami, when enormous popular enthusiasm for reform collided with institutions capable of blocking much of his agenda. We saw it during the Green Movement after the disputed 2009 election. We saw it during Hassan Rouhani's presidency, when the nuclear agreement briefly appeared capable of opening Iran economically and diplomatically, only for confrontation with the United States and domestic opposition to close much of that opening. We see it again today in the struggle between pragmatic figures such as President Masoud Pezeshkian and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the harder ideological forces that regard compromise as surrender.

The important point is that Ghalibaf himself is not a traditional reformist. He is a conservative establishment figure with deep roots in the Revolutionary Guards and the Islamic Republic. Yet even figures such as Ghalibaf increasingly confront realities that ideology cannot solve. Inflation, gasoline shortages, damaged infrastructure, declining purchasing power and economic isolation do not distinguish between reformist and conservative slogans. A refinery needs investment and technology. A currency needs confidence. Families need affordable food. Young people need jobs and a reason to remain in their country.

This creates an extraordinary political paralysis. The pragmatic side is powerful enough that the hardliners cannot simply eliminate it, while the hardliners remain powerful enough to prevent the pragmatic side from fundamentally changing the system. Presidents can be elected promising reform without possessing sufficient authority to deliver it. Conservatives can prevent reforms without necessarily possessing an economic program capable of solving the problems that made reform attractive in the first place.

For ordinary Iranians, this has become an exhausting political merry-go-round. They vote for reform, discover the limits of reform, become disappointed, withdraw or protest, watch conservatives consolidate power, suffer the consequences, and eventually another reformist or moderate appears promising that this time change will be possible. The personalities change, but the institutional contradiction remains.

That is why Iran's problem can no longer be understood simply as reformists versus conservatives. After decades of the same struggle, the deeper question is whether the political structure permits meaningful reform at all. If elected officials repeatedly discover that they cannot fundamentally change policy, then elections risk becoming mechanisms for changing administrators rather than changing the direction of the state.

Meanwhile, the population has changed dramatically. The young Iranian woman demanding control over her own life is not particularly interested in another twenty-year debate between reformists and conservatives about how much freedom she should eventually receive. The engineer considering emigration does not want another factional argument about who is responsible for economic failure. The pensioner watching inflation destroy purchasing power does not care which faction produces the next explanation.

Iran has spent decades debating how much the system should change while increasing numbers of Iranians are asking a different question: why should the system have the power to prevent change in the first place?

That may ultimately be the most important transformation taking place inside Iran. The old political contest was between reformists who wanted to modify the Islamic Republic and conservatives who wanted to preserve it. The emerging contest may increasingly be between an establishment still arguing over the degree of permissible change and a society that is tired of waiting for permission.

Submitted on Tuesday, Aug 25, 2026 at 9:00:00 PM

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