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The Iran War's Other Winners: Big Oil Cashes In While Consumers Pay the Bill

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.
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BIG OIL CASHES IN
BIG OIL CASHES IN
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The Iran War's Other Winners: Big Oil Cashes In While Consumers Pay the Bill

By Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.

Wars produce obvious winners and losers on the battlefield, but they also produce economic winners thousands of miles away from the fighting. The Iran war is increasingly demonstrating this uncomfortable reality. While civilians face insecurity, governments spend billions on military operations, consumers confront higher energy costs, and Iran struggles to sell its own petroleum, some of the world's largest multinational oil companies have found themselves operating in an extraordinarily profitable environment. ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Shell and TotalEnergies did not start this war, and there is no evidence that they determine its course. Nevertheless, the disruption of Persian Gulf energy markets has helped create precisely the combination of higher oil prices, wider refining margins and extreme market volatility from which large, geographically diversified energy corporations can benefit.

The Numbers Tell the Story

The financial results reported by the major oil companies are striking. ExxonMobil reported approximately $14.5 billion in earnings for the second quarter of 2026, compared with roughly $4.2 billion in the preceding quarter. Chevron reported approximately $12 billion in adjusted quarterly earnings, its highest quarterly profit in years. Shell's adjusted earnings reached approximately $9.8 billion, more than twice the level reported a year earlier, while BP reported approximately $5.7 billion in underlying replacement-cost profit compared with about $2.4 billion in the second quarter of 2025. TotalEnergies has also benefited from the dramatically altered international energy environment. These companies have different operations and exposures, and some have simultaneously experienced disruptions to their Middle Eastern businesses, but the broader pattern is difficult to ignore: the Iran war has helped create extraordinarily favorable conditions for major energy companies possessing production and refining capacity outside the immediate conflict zone.

The Geography of Profit

The apparent contradiction becomes easier to understand when geography is considered. An oil company heavily dependent upon production inside the Persian Gulf can suffer when shipping routes become dangerous, facilities are damaged or exports are interrupted. A global corporation, however, can lose some production in one region while simultaneously receiving dramatically higher prices for oil produced elsewhere. ExxonMobil, for example, has enormous production operations outside the Persian Gulf, including major assets in the Permian Basin and Guyana. When instability in the Gulf removes or threatens barrels of oil from the world market, the barrels Exxon produces safely elsewhere become more valuable.

Chevron enjoys a similar advantage. Its large American production base allows it to sell oil produced thousands of miles from the fighting at prices influenced by events in the Persian Gulf. This illustrates one of the peculiar characteristics of the international petroleum market: a bomb does not have to fall anywhere near a Texas oil field for the economic consequences of that explosion to increase the value of the oil coming from that field. When a major producing region becomes unstable, the geopolitical risk premium becomes incorporated into the international price of petroleum, benefiting producers whose own operations remain comparatively secure.

The Strait of Hormuz Changes the Equation

The Strait of Hormuz has always been one of the most important geographical chokepoints in the global economy. An enormous quantity of petroleum and liquefied natural gas normally passes through this narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea. When war threatens that traffic, the market does not wait for every tanker to stop moving before reacting. Insurance costs increase, shipping becomes more expensive, traders begin calculating the possibility of future shortages, and buyers compete more aggressively for alternative supplies.

This means that even partial disruption can have effects far beyond Iran. Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates all depend to varying degrees upon the security of Gulf transportation routes. Every additional military confrontation near these routes increases uncertainty. That uncertainty itself has economic value. For producers outside the region, it can translate into higher selling prices. For traders, it creates price differences that can be exploited. For refiners with secure access to crude oil, it can increase the value of the gasoline, diesel and other petroleum products they manufacture.

Refining May Be the Bigger Story

Much of the public discussion understandably concentrates on crude-oil prices, but refining may be one of the most important parts of the story. Crude oil sitting in a storage tank does not fuel an automobile, truck or airplane. It must be transported to a refinery and converted into gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and other usable products. When refining capacity is damaged or taken offline, the consequences can therefore be felt even when crude oil remains available somewhere else in the world.

This helps explain why downstream operations have become so profitable for some multinational oil companies. Chevron's downstream earnings rose dramatically during the second quarter, while ExxonMobil also recorded exceptionally strong downstream results. BP reported substantially stronger refining margins as part of the explanation for its improved financial performance. When refineries in or near a conflict region cannot operate normally, functioning refineries elsewhere become more valuable. A shortage of refining capacity can therefore generate large profits independently of the increase in the underlying price of crude oil.

War Creates Volatility, and Volatility Creates Opportunity

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D. Social Media Pages: Facebook Page       Twitter page url on login Profile not filled in       Linkedin page url on login Profile not filled in       Instagram Page

I was born and raised in Tehran, Iran, and came to the United States in 1976 to study psychology. Over time, America became my home, and I later became a U.S. citizen. My professional career has centered on clinical neuropsychology, particularly (more...)
 
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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.

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(Member since Dec 13, 2006), 6 fans, 149 articles, 166 quicklinks, 1074 comments (How many times has this commenter been recommended?)
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WHEN WAR BECOMES A BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY: BIG OIL NEVER WASTES A CRISIS

There is something deeply disturbing about the economic machinery surrounding the Iran war. While governments talk about national security, deterrence, military objectives and geopolitical strategy, multinational oil corporations look at the same crisis through an entirely different lens: price, scarcity, refining margins, shipping premiums and trading opportunities. ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Shell and TotalEnergies did not create this war, and I am not suggesting that they did. But when war disrupts one of the most important energy-producing regions on Earth, these corporations possess the capital, infrastructure and global reach to turn disruption into opportunity.

That opportunism does not necessarily require breaking any law or engaging in conspiracy. It is built into the structure of the international petroleum business. If instability in the Persian Gulf removes oil from the market, an Exxon or Chevron barrel produced safely in Texas or Guyana suddenly becomes more valuable. If refineries in the Middle East are disrupted, functioning refineries elsewhere can command much larger margins. If producers trapped behind dangerous shipping routes become desperate to move their oil, multinational traders with ships, insurance, financing and enormous balance sheets can purchase discounted crude and potentially resell it into higher-priced markets.

The trading side of this business deserves particular attention because it demonstrates how quickly human catastrophe can become a commercial calculation. A frightened producer sees a tanker facing a dangerous journey through the Strait of Hormuz. A sophisticated international trader sees the same tanker and calculates the discount, insurance premium, transportation cost and potential resale price. If the numbers work, the danger becomes a business opportunity. War is transformed into another variable on a corporate spreadsheet.

This does not mean that every oil company benefits from every development. Some multinational companies have lost production, faced evacuations, experienced transportation problems and suffered disruptions to Middle Eastern operations. But their enormous geographical diversification provides something ordinary people and smaller companies do not possess: the ability to shift the consequences of the crisis across a worldwide portfolio. Losses in one region can be overwhelmed by higher prices, refining margins or trading profits somewhere else.

The consumer has no comparable protection. The American filling his automobile cannot move his gasoline purchases to Guyana. The trucker cannot diversify his diesel bill across continents. The airline cannot simply ignore higher jet-fuel prices. Families eventually encounter these costs through gasoline, transportation, food and other consumer prices. The additional dollars disappear individually in small amounts but collectively become billions.

That is what makes the enormous profits generated during wartime energy disruptions politically significant. The money does not descend from the sky. Somewhere, someone is paying the higher price. When millions of consumers each pay more for energy and transportation, a portion of that enormous transfer eventually appears as additional revenue and profit somewhere else in the system.

Iran faces an especially cruel version of this paradox. It possesses enormous petroleum reserves, yet restrictions on its exports mean that it cannot fully benefit when international oil prices rise. Indeed, Iranian supply becoming less accessible can itself contribute to higher prices received by competing producers elsewhere. Iran can therefore become poorer while the commodity beneath Iranian soil becomes more valuable.

We should resist the temptation to turn this into an unsupported conspiracy theory. There is no need to claim that Big Oil secretly engineered the Iran war. The reality is disturbing enough without inventing one. The important issue is that our economic system permits enormous corporations to convert geopolitical catastrophe into extraordinary commercial opportunities simply because they possess the capital, infrastructure, ships, refineries, traders and geographical diversification necessary to exploit conditions that devastate others.

The moral question is therefore larger than whether ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP or Shell violated any law. They are corporations operating according to the incentives placed before them. The question for society is whether extraordinary profits generated substantially by war-induced scarcity should be treated exactly like profits created through innovation, productivity or genuine economic growth.

When a corporation invents a better technology, increases efficiency or creates something consumers voluntarily value, profit serves an understandable economic purpose. When billions in additional profits arise because tankers are threatened, refineries are disrupted, petroleum supplies become scarce and frightened consumers have no alternative but to pay more, we are dealing with something fundamentally different.

That is why the public should pay attention not only to the military battlefield but also to the financial battlefield. Every prolonged war creates people who desperately want it to end. Unfortunately, it can also create organizations for which another month of instability means another month of exceptional prices, margins and trading opportunities.

The uncomfortable truth is simple: war creates misery for millions, but for corporations positioned on the right side of scarcity, misery can be remarkably profitable.

Submitted on Wednesday, Aug 26, 2026 at 10:51:07 PM

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.

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BP AND IRAN: A CENTURY OF OIL, POWER AND PROFIT

If any oil company's profits from the Iran war deserve special historical attention, it is BP. For Iranians, BP is not simply another multinational corporation. Behind those two letters lies more than a century of Iranian oil, British imperial power, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Mohammad Mosaddegh, nationalization and the CIA-MI6 coup of 1953.

The story began with William Knox D'Arcy's enormous Iranian oil concession in 1901. Oil was discovered at Masjed Soleiman in 1908, and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was established the following year. Britain quickly recognized petroleum's strategic importance, especially after the Royal Navy began converting from coal to oil. In 1914, the British government acquired a controlling interest in the company. Iranian petroleum had become part of the strategic infrastructure of the British Empire.

The financial imbalance was extraordinary. According to Encyclopaedia Iranica, between 1912 and 1951 the company exported approximately 338 million tons of Iranian oil while paying Iran about -118 million. During roughly the same period, shareholders received about -115 million in dividends, while the British government received approximately -49 million in dividends and -175 million in taxes. These figures help explain why oil eventually became a symbol of Iranian national sovereignty rather than simply a commercial dispute.

The Anglo-Persian Oil Company became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1935, but changing the name did not eliminate Iranian resentment. By 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and Iran's parliament had nationalized the petroleum industry. Britain responded with enormous economic and political pressure and attempted to keep nationalized Iranian oil out of international markets. Britain also took the dispute to the International Court of Justice, which ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction.

Then came August 1953. British intelligence and the CIA collaborated in the operation that overthrew Mosaddegh. The CIA's participation is established in declassified American documents, while the historical record also demonstrates British involvement. Mosaddegh was removed and Mohammad Reza Shah returned with greatly strengthened power.

The 1954 oil settlement tells an equally important story. Iran formally retained ownership of its petroleum, but an international consortium returned foreign corporations to a central role in the Iranian oil business. Anglo-Iranian-- soon renamed British Petroleum-- received a 40 percent interest in the consortium, while American and other European petroleum companies obtained substantial shares.

This history makes BP's position during today's Iran war especially ironic. BP is obviously a very different corporation from the imperial-era Anglo-Persian Oil Company, but the corporate lineage is direct. Its global tentacles now extend across petroleum and natural-gas production, refining, shipping and international energy trading. That geographical diversification allows BP to turn disruptions in one part of the world into commercial opportunities elsewhere.

The contemporary numbers are striking. In the second quarter of 2026, BP reported approximately $5.73 billion in underlying replacement-cost profit, compared with roughly $2.35 billion a year earlier-- more than double. Higher oil and gas prices, stronger refining margins and trading conditions contributed to that performance. The Iran war did not create every dollar of BP's additional profit, but the energy shock surrounding the conflict has created exactly the kind of scarcity, higher prices and volatility from which an enormous integrated oil company can benefit.

The historical irony is difficult to escape. More than a century ago, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company made enormous profits from petroleum extracted from Iranian soil. When Iranians attempted to take control of that petroleum, Britain fought nationalization economically and politically. British and American intelligence then participated in overthrowing the prime minister identified with nationalization. Today Iran is again at the center of a geopolitical conflict disrupting world petroleum markets, and BP is again positioned to profit from the consequences.

This does not prove that BP caused the Iran war or wants it prolonged. No conspiracy theory is necessary. The documented history is powerful enough. The real issue is structural: corporations of BP's enormous size possess production fields, refineries, ships, traders and financial resources across the world. When war creates scarcity in one region, they can sell production elsewhere at higher prices, capture larger refining margins and exploit price differences created by disrupted markets.

Ordinary people have no comparable protection. Iranians experience bombing, sanctions, inflation and economic isolation. Americans and Europeans pay higher energy and transportation costs. Gulf economies face threats to production and shipping. BP sees those same disruptions reflected in crude prices, refinery margins, tanker rates and trading opportunities.

Few corporations illustrate the relationship between petroleum and geopolitical power in Iran as vividly as BP. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and eventually British Petroleum-- BP. Empires disappeared, Iran experienced revolution, and the petroleum industry changed enormously, but BP survived and expanded into one of the world's great energy corporations.

More than a century after its predecessor built an oil empire around Iranian petroleum, Iran is again bleeding while BP is making billions. That does not demonstrate conspiracy. It demonstrates something more enduring: oil, corporate power and Western geopolitical interests have been entangled in Iran's modern history for more than a century-- and BP has been there almost from the beginning.

Submitted on Thursday, Aug 27, 2026 at 4:46:39 AM

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