By assuming that the Lincoln County pipeline explosion cause was known, a flawed investigation was performed by the NTSB. Such a decision censored information from the public to prevent a complete understanding of the single burn death and 6 injuries, which resulted from a gas pipeline explosion that ruptured a 30-inch pipeline to create a 40-feet diameter crater (Figures 1 and 2).
NTSB Investigation
The NTSB generated 138 different documents to support their investigation, but provided no information about any operating conditions or any supporting technical data immediately prior to the explosion; and provided no information about gas pressures before, during and after the explosion. How can a report on a gas pipeline explosion not contain any information about the explosion itself?. Such withholding of information constitutes censorship, regardless of intent.
NTSB Report
To summarize the explosion - as concluded by the NTSB (National transportation Safety Board), excerpts follow from the final report for the "Enbridge Inc. Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire, Danville, Kentucky August 1, 2019" (click here).'The August 1, 2019, rupture of an Enbridge Inc. 30-inch natural gas transmission pipeline in Danville, Kentucky, which released about 101.5 million cubic feet of natural gas that ignited. The accident resulted in 1 fatality, 6 injuries, and the evacuation of over 75 people, as well as property damage in the surrounding area. Safety issues identified in this report include non-conservative assumptions used to calculate the potential impact radius, incomplete evaluation of the risks caused by a change of gas flow direction, limitations in data analysis related to in-line inspection tool usage, incomplete assessment of threats and threat interactions, and missed opportunities in training and requalification practices.'
'We found that the combination of a pre-existing hard spot (a manufacturing defect), degraded coating, and ineffective cathodic protection applied following a 2014 gas flow reversal project resulted in hydrogen-induced cracking at the outer surface of the pipeline and its subsequent failure.'
'The probable cause of the August 1, 2019, Enbridge Inc. pipeline rupture and resulting fire was the combination of a pre-existing hard spot (a manufacturing defect), degraded coating, and ineffective cathodic protection applied following a 2014 gas flow reversal project, which resulted in hydrogen induced cracking at the outer surface of Line 15 and the subsequent failure of the pipeline. Contributing to the accident was the 2014 gas flow reversal project that increased external corrosion and hydrogen evolution. Also contributing to this accident was Enbridge's integrity management program, which did not accurately assess the integrity of the pipeline or estimate the risk from interacting threats'.
A Major Cause for Concern
While the identified deficiencies were certainly important causes of the explosion, failure contributions from gas hammers were not investigated at all. The NTSB censoring of information from the public prevents a detailed analysis at this time - or any other time. As a matter of fact, the identification of gas hammer explosions was invented and first published two weeks before this explosion investigation ("The Primary Cause of Oil and Gas Pipeline Spills and Explosions", click here). PHMSA (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration)and the NTSB are jointly responsible for pipeline explosion safety. I raised this scary safety concern to PHMSA in the following email.
PHMSA Inaction Will Kill People, 5/18/2019PHMSA inaction is a serious problem that will result in loss of life. A clearly identified explosion hazard has been provided to the PHMSA, which constitutes a potential national emergency, and people will continue to die until action is taken. Based on years of research, the basic theory has been presented in the attached emails to monitor pipeline performance and stop explosions, yet the PHMSA fails to act. The PHMSA and the NTSB reported explosions with uncertain causes for decades, and I provided that missing explosion cause, yet the PHMSA fails to act. Accordingly, gas pipeline and oil pipeline safety is in jeopardy. We can work together to stop explosions and death.
To be clear, this new discovery demonstrates the common cause of pipeline ruptures and explosions in the oil and gas industries, and the recommended research will prevent deaths. The current recommended PHMSA decision will be of little value to the families of people who die in the interim. This research presents an opportunity for you and I to save lives. Please reconsider and let us work together. At present, I am the foremost expert anywhere in this field of research, where I have dedicated a major part of my life to preventing industrial fatalities.
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