China Will Defy Trump-- but It Will Not Save Iran
By Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.
The Message From Bishkek
The September 2026 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, produced an unusually revealing picture of Iran's place in the emerging Eurasian political order. Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian were all present at a gathering intended partly to demonstrate the increasing importance of institutions operating outside the traditional Western-centered international system. The Bishkek Declaration itself was supportive of Iran. SCO members condemned military attacks against Iranian territory, expressed support for Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity, opposed unilateral coercive economic measures, and endorsed resolving the conflict through political and diplomatic means. On paper, therefore, Tehran appeared to be among sympathetic partners.
Diplomacy, however, is communicated not only through declarations but also through meetings, schedules, photographs and the political attention leaders give one another. In that respect, Bishkek presented a more complicated picture. Pezeshkian and Xi spoke briefly, but there was no formal bilateral meeting between the two presidents, and the Chinese government released no substantive account of their encounter. Putin's treatment of Pezeshkian was strikingly different. The Russian president held a formal bilateral meeting with him accompanied by a large delegation of senior Russian officials responsible for foreign affairs, energy, transportation, economic development, nuclear energy and military-technical cooperation. Putin publicly declared Russia's "full solidarity" with Iran and emphasized that Moscow was continuing to provide Iran with goods and commodities it required.
It would go beyond the available evidence to claim that Xi deliberately intended to humiliate or personally snub Pezeshkian. Diplomatic schedules can have many explanations. Nevertheless, the contrast is difficult to dismiss because it fits a broader pattern in Chinese policy. The Mercator Institute for China Studies described Beijing's conduct at Bishkek as a careful balancing act: China continued supporting Iran institutionally while deliberately keeping top-level bilateral contact relatively low-profile. The episode therefore provides an excellent window into a larger reality. China regards Iran as a strategically useful partner, but it does not regard Iran as an ally whose interests automatically take precedence over China's relationships with Washington, the Arab Gulf states or the international economic system.
China Has No Intention of Taking Orders From Washington
One element of Chinese policy is nevertheless quite clear. Beijing rejects the proposition that American sanctions should determine China's commercial relations with Iran. The Trump administration has intensified its campaign against Iranian oil exports and against the commercial and financial networks that permit those exports to reach Chinese buyers. Washington has threatened secondary sanctions against foreign companies and financial institutions participating in Iranian trade and has specifically targeted parts of the Chinese refining and shipping system involved in purchases of Iranian petroleum.
China's rejection of these measures should not be interpreted primarily as an act of friendship toward Iran. Beijing has its own strategic reason for opposing American secondary sanctions. If China accepted the principle that Washington could determine which countries Chinese companies may trade with, it would implicitly accept a degree of American authority over Chinese foreign economic policy that Beijing has spent years attempting to reduce. Chinese opposition to unilateral American sanctions is therefore part of a much larger disagreement over the structure of the international economic system and the extraterritorial reach of American financial power.
China can consequently reject Trump's sanctions policy without making an unlimited commitment to Tehran. Beijing's position is essentially that American sanctions constitute American policy and do not automatically become Chinese law. That position, however, is entirely different from promising Iran that China will protect the Islamic Republic regardless of the economic, diplomatic or military consequences. Much of the confusion surrounding China-Iran relations results from treating these two propositions as though they were the same.
Iran Needs China Far More Than China Needs Iran
The fundamental asymmetry between Iran and China is perhaps the most important fact governing their relationship. China has become Iran's overwhelmingly dominant petroleum customer and one of its most important remaining economic connections to the outside world. American estimates have indicated that China purchases the great majority of Iran's exported crude oil. For an Iranian economy restricted by sanctions, difficulties in international banking and the costs of war, Chinese purchases have represented an essential source of foreign revenue.
Iran's importance to China is much more limited. China is the world's largest importer of crude petroleum and deliberately obtains its energy from a broad collection of suppliers. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and numerous other producers contribute to China's enormous energy supply system. Iranian petroleum is economically attractive, particularly when sanctions force Tehran to offer discounts, and independent Chinese refiners have benefited from those discounts. Nevertheless, China can replace a significant portion of Iranian oil more easily than Iran can replace the Chinese market.
The war has made this imbalance increasingly visible. Disruptions in the Persian Gulf and restrictions on Iranian exports have reduced the normal flow of Iranian petroleum toward China, while Chinese companies have been able to draw upon inventories, seek alternative suppliers and adjust transportation arrangements. Iran possesses no comparable ability to replace China as its principal customer. The relationship is therefore economically valuable to both countries, but the degree of dependence is profoundly unequal. That inequality gives Beijing substantial leverage over Tehran while giving Tehran much less leverage over Beijing.
The Persian Gulf Matters More to China Than Iran Alone
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