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China Will Defy Trump""but It Will Not Save Iran

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.
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CHINA WILL DEFY TRUMP
CHINA WILL DEFY TRUMP
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China Will Defy Trump-- but It Will Not Save Iran

By Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.

The Message From Bishkek

The September 2026 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, produced an unusually revealing picture of Iran's place in the emerging Eurasian political order. Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian were all present at a gathering intended partly to demonstrate the increasing importance of institutions operating outside the traditional Western-centered international system. The Bishkek Declaration itself was supportive of Iran. SCO members condemned military attacks against Iranian territory, expressed support for Iran's sovereignty and territorial integrity, opposed unilateral coercive economic measures, and endorsed resolving the conflict through political and diplomatic means. On paper, therefore, Tehran appeared to be among sympathetic partners.

Diplomacy, however, is communicated not only through declarations but also through meetings, schedules, photographs and the political attention leaders give one another. In that respect, Bishkek presented a more complicated picture. Pezeshkian and Xi spoke briefly, but there was no formal bilateral meeting between the two presidents, and the Chinese government released no substantive account of their encounter. Putin's treatment of Pezeshkian was strikingly different. The Russian president held a formal bilateral meeting with him accompanied by a large delegation of senior Russian officials responsible for foreign affairs, energy, transportation, economic development, nuclear energy and military-technical cooperation. Putin publicly declared Russia's "full solidarity" with Iran and emphasized that Moscow was continuing to provide Iran with goods and commodities it required.

It would go beyond the available evidence to claim that Xi deliberately intended to humiliate or personally snub Pezeshkian. Diplomatic schedules can have many explanations. Nevertheless, the contrast is difficult to dismiss because it fits a broader pattern in Chinese policy. The Mercator Institute for China Studies described Beijing's conduct at Bishkek as a careful balancing act: China continued supporting Iran institutionally while deliberately keeping top-level bilateral contact relatively low-profile. The episode therefore provides an excellent window into a larger reality. China regards Iran as a strategically useful partner, but it does not regard Iran as an ally whose interests automatically take precedence over China's relationships with Washington, the Arab Gulf states or the international economic system.

China Has No Intention of Taking Orders From Washington

One element of Chinese policy is nevertheless quite clear. Beijing rejects the proposition that American sanctions should determine China's commercial relations with Iran. The Trump administration has intensified its campaign against Iranian oil exports and against the commercial and financial networks that permit those exports to reach Chinese buyers. Washington has threatened secondary sanctions against foreign companies and financial institutions participating in Iranian trade and has specifically targeted parts of the Chinese refining and shipping system involved in purchases of Iranian petroleum.

China's rejection of these measures should not be interpreted primarily as an act of friendship toward Iran. Beijing has its own strategic reason for opposing American secondary sanctions. If China accepted the principle that Washington could determine which countries Chinese companies may trade with, it would implicitly accept a degree of American authority over Chinese foreign economic policy that Beijing has spent years attempting to reduce. Chinese opposition to unilateral American sanctions is therefore part of a much larger disagreement over the structure of the international economic system and the extraterritorial reach of American financial power.

China can consequently reject Trump's sanctions policy without making an unlimited commitment to Tehran. Beijing's position is essentially that American sanctions constitute American policy and do not automatically become Chinese law. That position, however, is entirely different from promising Iran that China will protect the Islamic Republic regardless of the economic, diplomatic or military consequences. Much of the confusion surrounding China-Iran relations results from treating these two propositions as though they were the same.

Iran Needs China Far More Than China Needs Iran

The fundamental asymmetry between Iran and China is perhaps the most important fact governing their relationship. China has become Iran's overwhelmingly dominant petroleum customer and one of its most important remaining economic connections to the outside world. American estimates have indicated that China purchases the great majority of Iran's exported crude oil. For an Iranian economy restricted by sanctions, difficulties in international banking and the costs of war, Chinese purchases have represented an essential source of foreign revenue.

Iran's importance to China is much more limited. China is the world's largest importer of crude petroleum and deliberately obtains its energy from a broad collection of suppliers. Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and numerous other producers contribute to China's enormous energy supply system. Iranian petroleum is economically attractive, particularly when sanctions force Tehran to offer discounts, and independent Chinese refiners have benefited from those discounts. Nevertheless, China can replace a significant portion of Iranian oil more easily than Iran can replace the Chinese market.

The war has made this imbalance increasingly visible. Disruptions in the Persian Gulf and restrictions on Iranian exports have reduced the normal flow of Iranian petroleum toward China, while Chinese companies have been able to draw upon inventories, seek alternative suppliers and adjust transportation arrangements. Iran possesses no comparable ability to replace China as its principal customer. The relationship is therefore economically valuable to both countries, but the degree of dependence is profoundly unequal. That inequality gives Beijing substantial leverage over Tehran while giving Tehran much less leverage over Beijing.

The Persian Gulf Matters More to China Than Iran Alone

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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D. Social Media Pages: Facebook Page       Twitter page url on login Profile not filled in       Linkedin page url on login Profile not filled in       Instagram Page

I was born and raised in Tehran, Iran, and came to the United States in 1976 to study psychology. Over time, America became my home, and I later became a U.S. citizen. My professional career has centered on clinical neuropsychology, particularly (more...)
 
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Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.

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IRAN HAS ANOTHER PROBLEM: WHO ACTUALLY SPEAKS FOR TEHRAN?

China's position toward Iran raises another question that may ultimately be even more important than Beijing's intentions: if China, Russia or the United States wants a negotiated end to the present crisis, who inside Iran actually possesses the political authority to make such an agreement stick?

President Masoud Pezeshkian has publicly called for implementation of the June Memorandum of Understanding. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek, he again indicated that Iran was prepared to reciprocate if Washington fulfilled its commitments. His position reflects the increasingly serious economic consequences of the war, sanctions and restrictions on Iranian oil exports. From Pezeshkian's perspective, negotiation offers a possible way to stop the economic deterioration before the damage becomes much more difficult to reverse.

The problem is that Pezeshkian is president of Iran, but he does not independently control the Iranian state's military and national-security apparatus. Decisions involving the war, the Strait of Hormuz, relations with the United States and the conditions under which Iran might accept a settlement involve institutions and political forces considerably more powerful than the presidency alone. Consequently, when Pezeshkian asks Washington to implement the MoU, the critical question is not simply whether he personally supports the agreement. It is whether he can obtain the support of the political and security establishment required to implement it.

This is where figures such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Ahmad Vahidi and Mohsen Rezaei become important. They should not all be placed into precisely the same political category. Ghalibaf appears to occupy a position between Pezeshkian's emphasis on negotiation and the harder position of important elements of the security establishment. He recognizes the economic consequences of prolonged conflict and has supported implementation of the MoU, but he has simultaneously insisted that Iran preserve its ability to retaliate against efforts to prevent Iranian oil exports. His position is therefore closer to negotiation backed by coercive leverage than to Pezeshkian's more urgent emphasis on ending the confrontation.

Vahidi represents a considerably harder security perspective. Mohsen Rezaei is also particularly important because his long association with the Revolutionary Guards and his position within Iran's national-security structure connect him directly to the institutions that must ultimately accept any strategic compromise. Their concerns are not limited to immediate economic conditions. They include Iran's military deterrence, the credibility of American commitments, the future of the Strait of Hormuz and the danger that concessions made under military and economic pressure could encourage Washington to demand additional concessions later.

The disagreement therefore goes considerably deeper than the familiar division between reformists and conservatives. Iran is confronting a fundamental dispute over how national survival should be defined. Pezeshkian and those favoring negotiations can argue that preserving the economy, restoring oil exports and preventing further destruction are themselves matters of national security. Harder elements within the security establishment can respond that accepting an agreement under American military and economic pressure could weaken Iran's deterrence and establish a precedent in which additional pressure produces additional Iranian concessions.

Ghalibaf's position illustrates the difficulty particularly well. He appears to recognize that Iran cannot indefinitely absorb the economic consequences of the conflict, yet he is unwilling to surrender the military and economic leverage Iran possesses in the Persian Gulf. This creates something closer to three competing approaches than two simple political camps: negotiation and implementation of the MoU as advocated by Pezeshkian; negotiation while maintaining coercive leverage, associated more closely with Ghalibaf; and a harder security position represented by figures such as Vahidi and influential elements surrounding the Revolutionary Guards.

This internal division also complicates China's strategy. Beijing may increasingly prefer a negotiated settlement because China needs stability in the Persian Gulf, predictable oil supplies and secure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. But China cannot solve Iran's internal political problem. Neither can Russia, Pakistan, Oman or any other potential mediator. Before an external power can negotiate successfully with Tehran, Iran's own centers of power must agree upon what Iran is prepared to accept.

The central political problem, therefore, is not that Pezeshkian fails to represent Iran in a constitutional or diplomatic sense. He is Iran's elected president and speaks officially for his government. The problem is that the presidency does not possess unilateral authority over all the institutions that determine Iranian national-security policy. A promise made by Pezeshkian can become a durable Iranian commitment only if the broader political, military and security establishment accepts it.

This may now be the most consequential political struggle taking place inside Iran. The economic pressure is increasing, the blockade is restricting oil revenue, China wants stability, and Pezeshkian is publicly asking for implementation of the MoU. Yet the ultimate decision will depend upon whether Iran's competing centers of power can agree on a common answer to the most basic question facing the country: is Iran now safer by continuing resistance, or by accepting the compromises necessary to end the war?

Until Tehran answers that question internally, the outside world may discover that negotiating with Iran is not merely a matter of determining what Iran wants. It is also a matter of determining who has the authority to decide.

Submitted on Sunday, Sep 6, 2026 at 12:05:22 AM

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