The Enemies of Peace
How Domestic Politics in Washington, Jerusalem, and Tehran Keep Wars Alive
Abbas Sadeghian, Ph.D.
Clinical Neuropsychologist
The Paradox of Modern War
Military victories do not necessarily produce political success. Throughout history, some of the world's most powerful armies have won battles, occupied territory, destroyed military infrastructure, and yet failed to achieve lasting political objectives. The reason is deceptively simple: wars are fought by armies, but they are prolonged-- or ended-- by political systems. This distinction has become increasingly important in the twenty-first century. Military technology has advanced dramatically, enabling states to strike targets with unprecedented precision and speed. Political institutions, however, continue to operate according to incentives that often reward confrontation more readily than compromise. Consequently, governments may continue conflicts long after military operations have ceased to serve their original strategic purpose.
The current confrontation among the United States, Israel, and Iran illustrates this paradox with unusual clarity. Public debate often focuses on individual leaders-- Donald Trump, Benjamin Netanyahu, or the leadership of the Islamic Republic-- as though the continuation or resolution of conflict depends primarily upon their personalities or decisions. Leadership undoubtedly matters. Yet concentrating exclusively on individual leaders' risks overlooking a more fundamental reality: political leaders operate within institutional environments that reward some choices while punishing others. The central argument of this article is therefore straightforward. The greatest enemies of peace are often not individual leaders but the domestic political incentive structures that make compromise politically costly and continued confrontation politically advantageous. Leaders may accelerate or slow the course of events, but they rarely act independently of the political systems that sustain their authority.
This perspective shifts the focus from personalities to institutions. Rather than asking why particular leaders choose conflict, we should ask why very different political systems-- liberal democracies, coalition governments, and revolutionary states-- often generate remarkably similar incentives to continue wars.
Beyond Personalities: Understanding Structural Incentives
Political commentary frequently attributes international crises to the ambitions, temperament, or ideology of individual leaders. While these factors unquestionably influence policy, they do not fully explain why similar patterns recur across different countries, cultures, and historical periods. A broader perspective suggests that wars often reflect deeper structural conditions. Economic uncertainty, geopolitical rivalry, domestic polarization, institutional competition, and declining public trust can create political environments in which leaders perceive firmness as politically safer than compromise. In such circumstances, the continuation of conflict may owe less to the preferences of any single individual than to the incentives embedded within the political systems themselves.
This distinction is critical. Individuals change. Governments change. Elections occur. Prime ministers resign. Presidents leave office. Yet the institutional and political pressures that reward confrontation frequently remain. Recognizing this broader context does not absolve leaders of responsibility. Rather, it acknowledges that sustainable peace requires more than replacing one political figure with another. It requires understanding-- and where possible, changing-- the incentive structures that shape political decision-making.
Political Psychology and the Logic of Escalation
Political psychology provides a useful framework for understanding why governments often continue conflicts despite mounting economic, military, and humanitarian costs. One important concept is escalation of commitment, first described by Barry Staw. Individuals and organizations that have invested substantial resources in a policy frequently continue pursuing it even after evidence suggests diminishing returns. Political leaders who have committed troops, resources, or national prestige to a military campaign may perceive withdrawal or compromise as an admission that earlier sacrifices were unnecessary.
Closely related is loss aversion, developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. Human beings generally experience losses more intensely than equivalent gains. Applied to international politics, this means that leaders often perceive the political cost of accepting a negotiated settlement after significant sacrifices as greater than the uncertain cost of continuing military operations. James Fearon's work on audience costs further explains why both democratic and authoritarian governments become trapped by their own rhetoric. Leaders who publicly promise decisive victory, unwavering deterrence, or uncompromising resistance risk appearing weak if they later pursue negotiations. Domestic political audiences frequently punish perceived inconsistency more severely than prolonged confrontation.
Robert Jervis demonstrated that prolonged crises foster misperception. Governments increasingly interpret ambiguous actions through existing assumptions about adversaries, reinforcing hostile expectations while discounting evidence that contradicts established narratives. Irving Janis's concept of groupthink likewise illustrates how closely connected political leadership circles may gradually suppress dissenting viewpoints precisely when alternative strategies deserve the most careful consideration. Taken together, these psychological mechanisms help explain why wars often become self-sustaining. Once conflict begins, political leaders confront pressures that make de-escalation psychologically and politically more difficult than continued escalation.
Different Political Systems, Similar Political Pressures
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